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Abstract—In the last years, cryptocurrencies are increasingly
popular. Even people who are not experts have started to invest in
these securities and nowadays cryptocurrency exchanges process
transactions for over 100 billion US dollars per month. However,
many cryptocurrencies have low liquidity and therefore they are
highly prone to market manipulation schemes.
In this paper, we perform an in-depth analysis of pump and
dump schemes organized by communities over the Internet. We
observe how these communities are organized and how they carry
out the fraud. Then, we report on two case studies related to
pump and dump groups. Lastly, we introduce an approach to
detect the fraud in real time that outperforms the current state
of the art, so to help investors stay out of the market when a
pump and dump scheme is in action.
Index Terms—Cryptocurrencies, Fraud Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Pump and dump is a market manipulation fraud that consists
in artificially inflating the price of an owned security and then
selling it at a much higher price to other investors [1], [2]. This
fraud is as old as the stock market. One of the most famous
pump and dumps of Wall Street history happened in the late
’20. The security was the RCA Corporation, the manufacturer
of the first all electric phonograph. At that time, one of
the hottest pieces of technology. The fraud was organized
by the ”Radio Pool”, a group of investors that artificially
pumped RCA to the incredible price of $549, and then dumped
the shares making the price plummet to under $10. A large
number of investors lost all of their savings in this operation.
Communication was done through the radio, tabloids, and
word of mouth. In the Bitcoin era, pump and dumps are more
vital than ever. Indeed, communication is done through the
Internet and the Web, and the targets are the hectic and almost
non-regulated markets of cryptocurrencies.
The most common way to buy cryptocurrencies is through
a cryptocurrency exchange. Exchanges convert fiat currencies
into cryptocurrencies, and cryptocurrencies between them-
selves. A cryptocurrency exchange works exactly like the
traditional stock exchange. There are now hundreds of cryp-
tocurrencies, the market is not strictly regulated, and prices are
easy to manipulate. So, pump and dumps on these securities
are incredibly common, with public groups in the Internet,
rules, and precise and complex organization. One of the first
cases known to the public involves cryptocurrency prophet
John McAfee, who is one of the defendant in a complicated
case of alleged pump and dump [3]. The suit is linked to an
investigation of the US SEC, a US financial regulator. Now,
pump and dumps are led by a large number of self-organized
groups over the Internet, and the phenomenon is viral though
still not very well known.
In this work we describe the pump and dump phenomenon
in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. We present two relevant case
studies. In the first, we perform a longitudinal analysis of
the gathered pump and dumps on 4 different exchanges. In
the second, we focus on Big Pump Signal, the biggest group
we found in our research. Big Pump Signal is a group that
works on Binance, able to generate a volume of transactions
of 5, 176 BTC in a single operation, higher than the 534
BTC volume generated together by all the pump and dumps
scheme arranged on Cryptopia, YoBit and Bittrex according
to [4]. Lastly, we introduce a novel detection algorithm that
works in real-time. The algorithm is not just based on the
detection of the abrupt rise of the price. The fundamental idea
is to leverage the abnormal growth of so-called market buy
orders, buy orders that are used when the investor wants to buy
extremely quickly, whatever the price is. Just like the colluding
members of a pump and dump group when the pump starts.
We show that our real-time detector outperforms the current
state of the art [5] in a significant way, improving the expected
speed of the detection from 30 minutes to 25 seconds and, at
the same time, the F1-score from 60.5% to 92%.
II. PUMP AND DUMP GROUPS
Pump and dumps are performed by self-organized groups of
people over the Internet. These groups arrange the frauds out
in the open on the Telegram [6] instant messaging platform or
Discord server [7], thus everyone can join the groups without
prior authorization. During our longitudinal research, from
July 2017 to January 2019, we joined and daily followed
all the activities performed by more than 100 groups. Being
member of the groups allowed us to retrieve and collect one
of a kind information such as internal group organization, the
phases of pump and dump arrangement and how the groups
attract outside investors inside the market. Table I shows
some metrics and characteristics of 8 representative groups
we joined. In the following section, we report on the findings
we discovered about these communities.
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TABLE I
METRICS OF PUMP AND DUMP GROUPS
Group name Telegram Users Discord Users Hierarchy Main Exchange PnD (#) avg. Volume ($)
Big Pump Signal 72, 097 104,830 affiliation Binance 32 7,245,437
Trading Crypto Guide 91, 725 — vip Binance 17 2,442,923
Crypto Coin B 166, 689 — vip Binance 6 5,733,637
Crypto4Pumps 11, 716 — vip Bittrex 47 491,395
Pump King Community 7, 771 — vip Bittrex 18 931,960
Crypto Family Pumps 4, 449 5,299 free Cryptopia 28 23,800
Luxurious pumps 6, 020 — free YoBit 16 4,997
AltTheWay 7, 333 — free YoBit 89 700
Fig. 1. Screenshot of a Discord Info room, where it is explained how the
affiliation system works.
A. Group organization
Pump and dumps groups have leaders (or admins) that
administrate the group, and a hierarchy of members. If a
member is higher in the hierarchy, he gets the message that
starts the pump by revealing the target cryptocurrency a few
moments earlier than lower ranked members. This way, the
member has higher probability to buy at a lower price and
make more money out of the pump and dump operation. The
advantage in terms of time of being at a higher level is usually
between 0.5 and 1 second with respect to the next level, and
the maximum advantage is in the interval between 3 and 8
seconds. Most groups are organized as an affiliation system
—climbing the hierarchy is possible by bringing new people
to the group. The larger is the number of new members brought
to the group, the higher the ranking. Fig. 1 shows the affiliation
system of Big Pump Signal group and the rank’s benefits.
Some groups have a simpler hierarchy with only two levels:
Common members and VIP members. In these groups, to
become a VIP the user has to pay a fee, usually in Bitcoins,
in the range of 0.01 to 0.1 Bitcoins (from approximately 71 to
710 USD at current exchange rates1). In the pump and dump
groups, the admins are the only people that take decisions. We
saw only in rare cases the admins running polls to agree on
the hour of the pump or the exchange to use, and never to
decide the target cryptocurrency.
B. Group communication
To communicate and organize the pump, the groups typ-
ically use Discord servers and Telegram channels. Telegram
1Data retrieved on January 10, 2020
is an instant messaging service, and a Telegram channel is a
special kind of a chat in which only the owner of the channel
can broadcast public messages to all the members. Discord is
a VoIP and text chat service. It was originally designed for
video gaming communities, but nowadays it is widely used
by other communities as well.
Discord offers the possibility to create macro sections and
host multiple chat rooms. Each section has its own topic. In our
analysis we have found that all the pump and dump Discord
servers are organized in roughly the same fashion, with the
following sections:
• Info & How-Tos: These two sections are like an elec-
tronic bulletin board with pinned messages. Both sections
are composed of several rooms that contain only one
or very few messages. The rooms of the Info section
usually contain the rules of the group, the news about
the group, how the affiliation system works (Fig. 1), and
the F.A.Q.. The rooms of the How-Tos section contain
manuals related to the cryptocurrency world or the best
practices to participate in a pump and dump operation.
• Invite: This section contains rooms where the bots of the
server live. Here, the users can query the bots in order to
generate invite links to bring new members or to know
the number of people that joined the server by using their
invite links.
• Signal: This is the core section of the group, in which
only the admins can write. Inside this section there are
usually two rooms: The pump-signal, and the trading-
signal. In the first room, the admins share info about the
next pump and dump operation. In the second, they share
trading advices.
• Discussion: in this section, there are rooms covering
different topics where the group members can freely chat.
Usually, the messages written in the news and in the pump-
signal rooms are broadcasted to the Telegram channel as well.
C. Organization of the pump and dump operations
The levels of activity of the many pump and dump groups in
the Internet differ considerably. The most active ones perform
roughly one pump and dump operation a day. Less active
groups perform one operation a week. Other groups perform
operations only when they believe the market conditions are
good. The steps during the operation are typically as follows:
Fig. 2. Messages that indicate the start of a pump and dump operation on
the Streamr DATAcoin (on the left) and the NevaCoin (on the right).
• A few days or hours before the operation the admins
announce that the pump and dump will happen and
communicate which is the exchange that will be used,
the exact starting time of the operation, and whether the
operation will be FFA (Free for All—everybody gets the
message at the same time) or Ranked (VIPs and members
of higher levels in the hierarchy get the starting message
before the other members).
• The announce is repeated several times, more frequently
as the starting time of the operation gets closer.
• When the pump starts, the target cryptocurrency is re-
vealed to the members of the group. The exact time
depends on the position in the hierarchy. Usually, the
name of the cryptocurrency is contained in an image
that is obfuscated in a way that only humans can read it
quickly. Fig. 2 shows an example, a message that instructs
to start a pump and dump operation on the NevaCoin. The
idea behind the obfuscation is to make it hard for bots
to parse the message with OCR techniques and start the
market operations faster than humans.
• Lastly, a few seconds after the start of the pump, the
admins share a tweet or a news and invite all the members
of the group to spread the information that the price of
the cryptocurrency is rising. This is done in dedicated
chat boxes, forums, and Twitter. The goal of this activity
is to create so-called FOMO (Fear of Missing Out) of a
good opportunity of investment and attract investors from
outside the group.
III. CASE STUDY
A. The groups, the pump and dumps, and the exchanges
In this section, we describe an in-depth investigation on the
cryptocurrencies and the exchanges used for the pump and
dumps. We do so in a period of time that goes from July
2017 to January 2019. In this period, we found more than 100
groups, by keyword search (e.g.: ”Pump”,”Dump”,”Signal”)
on Telegram, Twitter, Reddit, BitcoinTalk [8], or manually
extracting information from CoinDetect [9] or the PADL [10]
Android app. From this set, we select 19 different groups, since
the other are no longer active, only broadcast event from other
groups, or the number of users was quite small. Reading the
Telegram channel history of these groups, we found 343 pump
and dump operations carried out on 4 exchanges. For all the
pump and dumps collected, we retrieved the historical trading
data, as much detailed as we can, scraping the exchanges’
website or via APIs. Analyzing our data, we found that the
scheme involved 194 different cryptocurrencies, only 143 of
which are still listed by the Coinmarketcap site. It is quite
common that coins disappear from the cryptocurrency world.
Indeed, by analyzing the volumes in the last 24 hours of the
cryptocurrencies that are still active, we found out that 112 of
them moved less than $1 million in total in all the exchanges
in which they are listed. Actually, 46 of them moved less than
$10, 000.
Also, 100 of the coins used for pump and dumps are below
20 million dollars of market capitalization, with 34 of them
being below 1 million. The first asset with less than 20 million
dollars is at the 220th position of the cryptocurrency ranking
by market capitalization. So, the targets of pump and dumps
have a very low net worth value and a huge amount of
circulating supply. Lastly, we find that 99 cryptocurrencies
out of 141 are priced below 0.4 dollars. As such, with a
relatively small investment, pump and dump groups can buy
huge amounts of shares and easily increase their price in the
pump phase of the fraud.
YoBit is the exchange where most of pump and dump op-
erations happen, while Binance is the most popular exchange
among all groups. Each pump and dump group tends to use
the same exchange. Indeed, if the groups jumped from one
exchange to the other, the members would be forced to move
their assets accordingly and pay the related fees. The pump
and dumps on currencies with higher market capitalization
are typically carried out on Binance, the ones with lower
market capitalization on Cryptopia. In particular, the median
market capitalization of the cryptocurrencies for exchange is
$25, 574, 192 for Binance, $2, 619, 703 for YoBit, $2, 512, 627
for BitTrex, and $144, 373 for Cryptopia.
Finally, we notice that pump and dump schemes do not
affect only the target exchange. Indeed, the cryptocurrency
markets, like the real stock exchange markets, are constantly
under monitoring of arbitrage bots that look for profitable trad-
ing. Arbitrage is a practice that consists of taking advantage
of the price difference between two markets by buying in
one market and selling in another market at a higher price.
Some seconds after a pump and dump starts, the price of the
coin under attack quickly increases its price. The price spike
triggers the arbitrage bots that start to buy and sell the currency
on a different market or other trading pairs. Table II reports the
values during the pump and dump carried out on the Streamr
DATAcoin (DATA) of the 29th of September 2018 for different
exchanges. As we can see, the biggest transaction volumes
and the highest prices are reached on Binance. Indeed, it was
the exchange used for the operation. However, also the other
exchanges record a rise of the price in the same time range.
TABLE II
EFFECT OF ARBITRAGE.
Trading pair Exchange Volume ($) Open ($) Max($)
DATA/BTC Binance 5, 732, 909 0.0354 0.0916
DATA/ETH Binance 568, 722 0.0353 0.0924
DATA/BTC Bitfinex 103, 318 0.0353 0.0564
DATA/ETH Bitfinex 62, 640 0.0333 0.0552
DATA/USD Bitfinex 175, 274 0.0349 0.0551
DATA/BTC HitBTC 27, 502 0.0359 0.0564
DATA/ETH HitBTC 5, 084 0.0330 0.0735
DATA/USDT Gateio 31, 357 0.0347 0.0600
B. The Big Pump Signal group
With more than 104, 000 members on Discord and more
than 72, 0002 members on Telegram, Big Pump Signal (BPS)
started in December 2017 over Telegram and is arguably the
largest pump and dump public community in the Internet.
Reading the pump announcements on the Telegram channel
of Big Pump Signal, we found 32 pumps, 27 of which
carried out on Binance (see Figure 3)and 5 on Cryptopia.
Throughout all their pump and dump operations, the group
moved 82, 369, 542 USD globally, if we count the first 6
minutes of every pump, and 267, 482, 773 USD globally, if
we count the whole coin oscillation due to the pump. Their
most successfully pump and dump was organized on May
10, 2018, when they targeted the SingularDTV (SNGLS) alt-
coin. In this operation, the value of the SNGLS coins sharply
oscillated for more than 9 hours and recorded a volume of
trades of 5, 176 Bitcoin (36, 750, 000 USDs). BPS has an
affiliation hierarchy, the highest level of which is achievable
after inviting 250 new members. In ranked pump and dump
operations, the affiliation guarantees the members to receive
the signal 3 seconds before the unranked members. The Big
Pump Signalers have, since the beginning, promoted the group
in many ways: Advertisement on main social networks like
Twitter and Quora, through the affiliation systems, and, by
organizing lotteries inside the groups with prizes in Bitcoin
or Ethereum. Thanks to the aggressive marketing campaigns
and the hype on the cryptocurrencies in late 2017, the Big
Pump Signal group has grown extremely fast reaching around
200, 000 members in January 2018.
1) Organization of the BPS operations: The organization of
the BPS pump and dumps steadily improved with time. In the
beginning, they operated on a single coin, while double trading
on the Bitcoin and Ethereum target pairs. The target coin was
revealed to the members in plain text. They were also given
a target price with the goal of pushing the pump up to the
target so to attract external investors and, afterwards, profit
by selling to them. However, this strategy was the opposite
of being optimal for the admins: They noticed that greedy
group members started to sell below the target price value,
forbidding the pump and dump operation to reach the highest
peaks. So, they stopped indicating the target price and carried
2Data retrieved on January 2019
Fig. 3. Big Pump Signal pump and dumps
the purchasing power in a single trading pair to get maximum
gain.
Successively, the admins discovered the presence of bots
inside the channel. The bots were very fast at buying, much
faster than the group members. To mitigate their effect, the
admins changed the pump and dump signal–from a text, to an
obfuscated image–so that it was extremely difficult for bots to
read.
As the group grew bigger, the admins started targeting
also cryptocurrencies with medium market capitalization. The
admins claim that the choice of the coin is typically based
on technical analysis. They also claim to re-pump the cryp-
tocurrencies by collaborating with a small investment firm.
The investment firm is thought to be frequently involved in
or to organize pump and dumps on her own. An example are
the pump and dumps of the Monetha coin (MTH) and the
WePower (WPR) coin on the Binance platform on September
17, 2018. Our analysis shows that BPS typically chooses cryp-
tocurrencies that have had a steady price and news coverage
in the recent past. They exploit the news coverage to generate
interest and attract external investors. An example are the
retweets of news from the fake twitter account of John McAfee
(@oficiallmcafee, and the still reachable @TheJohnMcafee)
belonging to the admins of the group.
2) Analysis of the pump phase: The BPS group moves large
volumes of Bitcoins in each operation. We analyse one of
these operations to investigate in depth the pump phase, the
most interesting step of a pump and dump operation. Figure. 4
depicts a second by second zoomed image on the very first
30 seconds of the pump on the OAX cryptocurrency. The
upper (blue line) in the figure represents the buy volume, while
the (lower) orange one the sell volume. We observe that the
volume of the buys and sells in the first seconds is very close to
zero. Then, there are two buy peaks (blue line in Figure 4) of
approximatively 65 Bitcoins (sec. 19) and 26 Bitcoins (sec. 21)
respectively. The two peaks correspond to the actions of VIPs
and the common members—a normal behavior, considering
that the group has a ranked policy. We also observe a peak
on the sell volumes (orange line in Figure 4) of almost 10
Fig. 4. Pump on the OAX
Bitcoins on the moment of the first buy peak, the 19th second.
Considering that group members are still buying and that the
reaction time for outsiders is too short, this sudden big sell
volume is abnormal. In fact, there can be only two possible
actors to sell their shares: the bots and the admins. In order
to discern among the two we need to investigate the single
transactions. Our analysis shows that, as the price rises, there
are many small sell operations at incremental values, probably
by the arbitrage bots. Then, we observe a last single shot
transaction for over 4 Bitcoins when the OAX coin reaches
the trading value of 0.00012 Bitcoins, probably done by the
admins of the group. We believe they have operated through
a sell limit trade order—a conditional order triggered when
the price of a trading pair reaches/out-tops a given value. Of
course, the same order could have been placed also by an
outside investor. However, we believe that a sell limit for that
amount and that overcomes the initial price of the 41% is most
likely by an insider.
IV. PUMP AND DUMP DETECTION
A. The idea
As we know, standard investors are the victims of pump
and dump schemes. When they see that the price of a cryp-
tocurrency rise, they can believe it can be a good investment
opportunity. This is not the case when a pump and dump
scheme is in action—the rise does not have economical
grounds, it is just market manipulation. To protect investors,
it is important to understand if a pump and dump scheme can
be detected, and how fast it can be done. This is the goal of
this section.
To better understand how pump and dumps can be detected,
it is important to have some basic notions. The pending orders
for a cryptocurrency, like any other security, are listed in the
order book for that cryptocurrency. The book is a sorted double
list of sell (ask) and buy (bid) orders not yet filled. The asks
are sorted from the lowest price to the highest, the bids are
sorted from the highest to the lowest. The fastest way to buy
on the market is through a buy market order. A buy market
order looks up the order book and fills all the pending asks
until the requested amount of currency is reached. Although a
market order is completed almost instantly, the price difference
between the first and the last ask needed to fill the order can
be very high, especially in markets with low liquidity, and so
the price can rise considerably. A more careful investor would
use limit buy orders, orders to buy a security at no more than
a specific price. Buy market orders are not frequent in normal
transactions and are typically used by investors that need a fast
execution. Just like the members of pump and dump groups
in action. Our idea is to use this pattern, along with other
information about volume and price, to detect when a pump
and dump scheme starts.
B. The data
As highlighted by Kamps et al. [5], it does not exist a dataset
of confirmed pump and dumps in the literature. So we need to
build one for the purpose of this work. Starting from the 19
groups we joined, we select only the pump and dump schemes
carried out on Binance. We made this choice for two main
reasons: The first one is that Binance exposes APIs [11] that
allow to retrieve every single transaction in the whole history
of a trading pair, differently from other exchanges that allow to
retrieve data with a transaction granularity only for few hours
back. The second is that pump and dumps on other exchanges
are usually carried out by groups with few active members
and economic resource, consequently they are forced to target
alt-coin that have almost no volume of transactions for days
before the scheme. Thus, we believe that pump and dumps
carried out on Binance are the most interesting and challenging
to detect. From the initial set of pump and dumps, we select
all the events that were carried out on Binance. At the end
we get 104 pump and dump events, arranged by 12 different
groups. Doing so, we retrieve the historical trading data for 7
days before and after the event, for a total of 14 days. Some
pump and dumps were carried out a few days apart on the
same alt-coin, so we discarded duplicate days. In the end, we
have about 900 days of trading. The data are a list of trade
records: Volume, price, operation type (buy or sell), and the
UNIX timestamps. The trades are provided by Binance in a
compressed way, this means that a record belonging to the
same order at the same price have aggregated quantities, and
a single order that is filled at different prices is splitted into
more records.
Unfortunately, the Binance APIs do not tell the kind of order
(e.g.: Market, Limit, Stop Loss) placed by the buyer, so we
need to infer this information. To do this, we can use the
fact that these kind of orders are filled in a single shot, and
so we can aggregate the trades filled at the same millisecond
as a single one. Since we do not know the original nature
of these orders we define them as rush orders. A problem
of this inference method is that it misses the orders that are
completely filled by the first ask of the order book. Still, we
believe that we have a good witness on the abrupt rise of
market orders even with this approximation. As a contribution
to the community we will publicly release this dataset.
C. Features and classifiers
To detect the start of the fraudulent scheme, we analyze
several kinds of features and use them to feed two different
classifiers: Random Forest and Logistic Regression. A Ran-
dom Forest [12] is an ensemble learning method consisting
of a collection of decision tree classifiers such that each tree
depends on the values of a random vector sampled indepen-
dently, each tree casts a vote, and the prediction is the most
popular class among all the votes. Logistic regression [13] is
a type of regression analysis used to calculate the outcome
of dependent variables based on one or more independent
variables estimating the parameters of a logistic model, where
the value of the predictor variable is between 0 and 1. We built
our features upon the idea of [14] for the detection of Denial
of Service attacks through an adaptive threshold. Since in our
case we do not want to find a threshold, we restyle their idea
in this way: We split our data in chunks of s seconds, and we
define a moving window of size w hours.
We conduct several experiments with different sets of fea-
tures and settings regarding the window and the chunk sizes.
Since our goal was to build a classifier able to detect a pump
and dump scheme as quickly as possible from the moment
it starts, it is crucial that the chunk size is reasonably short.
At the end of our study, we found that the best configuration,
in terms of F1-score, was achieved with a chunk size of 25
seconds and a window size of 7 hours, while the fastest one
with a chunk size of 5 seconds and a windows size of 50
minutes. Following are reported the final features we used:
• StdRushOrders and AvgRushOrders: Moving standard
deviation and average of volume of rush orders in each
chunk of the moving window.
• StdTrades: Moving stardard deviation of the number of
trades, both buy and sell.
• StdVolumes and AvgVolumes: Moving standard devia-
tion and average of volume of trades in each chunk of
the moving window.
• StdPrice and AvgPrice: Moving standard deviation and
average of closing price.
• AvgPriceMax and AvgPriceMin: Moving average of
maximal and minimum price in each chunk.
Once a pump is detected we pause our classifier for 30
minutes to avoid multiple alerts for the same event.
D. The importance of rush orders
In this section, we explore how the rush orders are important
to detect the start of a pump and dump operation. Fig. 6
shows the number of rush orders during a pump and dump
scheme on the VIBE cryptocurrency on September 9th, 2018.
As we can see, rush orders are rare during the hours before the
pump and suddenly grow just at the start of the scheme. The
goal of this experiment is to understand if the rush orders
are an effective feature to detect the start of a pump and
dump scheme and find a threshold beyond which classify the
growth as anomalous. To learn the threshold, we proceed as
follows: We compute the StdRushOrder feature as described
Fig. 5. Precision recall curve for train and test sets.
Fig. 6. Rush orders during a pump and dump scheme.
in Section IV-C, then we label each chunk as True if the
timestamp of the pump and dump signal falls into the chunk
time range, False otherwise. We randomly split our dataset into
the train (50%) and test (50%) sets, we compute the precision-
recall curve for the train set, and we pick a threshold that is a
tradeoff between the precision and the recall. Then we evaluate
the same metrics at the picked threshold for the test set. The
result of this experiment is shown in Fig. 5. We choose as value
for the threshold (the black dashed line in the figure) 30.32
that provides a precision of 91.1% and a recall of 89.9% on
the train set (the blue line). As we can see, the same threshold
value provides a very similar score on the test set too (the red
dashed line). Given these good results, we can assume that the
rush orders feature is an extremely good parameter to evaluate
the start of a pump and dump.
E. The results
Although we retrieved 2 weeks of data for each pump
and dump scheme, initially we use only 3 days—the day of
the fraud, the day before, and the day after—since in this
timeframe we can assume that no other frauds are present in
the dataset. We noticed that, among the market manipulations
we collected, different groups arrange schemes on the same
alt-coin a few days apart. Moreover, we are aware that some
groups delete the pump and dump signal from the chat history
and that there do exist groups that we are not able to monitor
TABLE III
CLASSIFIERS PERFORMANCE.
Classifier Chunk size Precision Recall F1
Kamps (Initial) 1 Hour 15.6% 96.7% 26.8%
Kamps (Balanced) 1 Hour 38.4% 93.5% 54.4%
Kamps (Strict) 1 Hour 50.1% 75.0% 60.5%
RF (5 Folds) 5 Sec 92.4% 78.4% 84.0%
RF (10 Folds) 5 Sec 92.2% 77.5% 82.7%
RF (5 Folds) 15 Sec 91.3% 84.4% 87.7%
RF (10 Folds) 15 Sec 91.1% 83.3% 87.0%
RF (5 Folds) 25 Sec 93.7% 91.3% 91.8%
RF (10 Folds) 25 Sec 93.1% 91.4% 92.0%
TABLE IV
FEATURE IMPORTANCE.
Feature Importance
StdRushOrders 0.401
StdTrades 0.202
AvgRushOrders 0.153
AvgVolumes 0.097
StdVolumes 0.076
StdPrice 0.026
AvgPrice 0.014
AvgPriceMax 0.014
AvgPriceMin 0.011
such as groups that communicate in Chinese or Russian or in
private groups. Since our dataset consists of 104 pump and
dumps, we do not split the dataset into the standard train test
sets, but we performed a 5 and 10 folds cross-validation, in
order to get a more reliable evaluation of the performance.
For the Random Forest classifier we use a forest of 200 trees,
each leaf node must have at least 6 samples, and a maximum
depth of 4 for each tree. For the Logistic Regression classifier,
we used the BFGS solver with a regularization strength of C
equals to 1. Since we notice that the classifiers based on the
Random Forest algorithm perform slightly better than the ones
based on the Logistic Regression in all the chunk size, for
the Logistic Regression model we report in Tab III only the
results with a chunk size of 25 seconds. Moreover, from the
results of the Random Forest classifier, it is possible to note
the relationship between the chunk size and the performance
of the classifiers. Indeed, while the precision is pretty stable
in all the time frames, the recall increases as we increase the
chunk size dimension.
In Tab IV we list the importance, computed with the Gini
Impurity, of each feature used with the Random Forest classi-
fier. As we can see, the best features are the ones based on the
rush orders and the number of trades. Once our methodology
has been finalized, we trained a 25 second detector classifier
with the 3 day dataset and used the remaining part as test
looking for other suspect events. After the evaluation, we got
29 events that we are not able to link to evidence. We believe
that virtually all of them are pump and dumps, whose evidence
has been deleted or organized by groups that may not be
Fig. 7. DLT candlestick chart
public. Fig. 7, for example, shows the candlestick chart for
the Agrello coin (DLT), from May 8 to 13. The event in the
center is a pump and dump for which we have evidence, the
other two are suspects detected by the algorithm. As you can
see, the behavior is almost the same, including the fact that the
currency goes back to the normal price quickly (the dump).
Our classifier, based on the detection of the abnormal presence
of rush orders and not just on the price of the security, does
a good job in detecting pump and dumps and suspect events
that, anyways, the mindful investor wants to stay away from.
The classifier is also very fast—in all the cases the pump and
dump is detected within a timeframe of 5 seconds and, in
some cases, even before the start of the pump when there is
pre-pump activity in action.
F. Comparison with other pump and dump detectors
After validating our classifier, to better understand the
performance of our solutions we introduce the pump and dump
detector of Kamps et al. [5] as the baseline. In their work,
they simulate a real-time detector using as input candlesticks
of 1 hour to detect pump and dumps. So, detection time
can be up to 1 hour, with an expectation of 30 minutes.
To detect pump and dumps their methodology exploit two
anomaly thresholds one for transactions volume and the other
for the coin price. They compute the values of the thresholds
using average windows on the recent history of the candlestick
under observation. Hence, if both the price and the volume
are higher than the computed thresholds they mark the point
as pump and dump event. Finally, Kamps et al. provide 3
different parameter configurations to compute the threshold:
Initial, Balanced, and Strict. The Basic configuration maximize
the recall, the Strict the precision, while the Balanced is a trade
off between the previous two. In their work they only mention
the number of alleged pump and dumps that their classifier
detects, unfortunately they are not able to provide scores in
terms of precision and recall since their dataset lacks of ground
truth.
To use the Kamps et al. detector as the baseline for our
task, we start replicating their classifier and testing it on their
dataset, detecting the same number of the pump and dumps
they declare in their work. Then, we apply their methodology
on our dataset; results are shown in Table III. As we can see,
all our classifiers outperform in terms of F1-score the Kamps
et al. detectors. Note the difference in performance between
their best configuration based on Strict parameters and our
slowest classifier: Not only our performances are considerably
better than theirs, we score 93.1% of precision and 91.4%
recall against their 50.1% precision and 75.0% recall, but our
detector is also faster. These results also highlight that, due
to the high volatility of the cryptocurrencies market, detectors
based only on the coin price and transaction volume are prone
to a large number of false positives.
Differently from us, Xu et al. [4] build a classifier able
to predict the currency target of the next pump and dump to
provide a tool for strategic trade. Since the goals are different,
we can not make a comparison in terms of performance
between our work and their solutions. Indeed, they prefer
to maximize the probability of gain from the investment
maximizing the recall at the expense of low precision. They
assume that buying wrong currencies does not affect their
trading strategy because the value of a not pumped coin will
remain at the same level as the purchase price and so do not
produce an economic loss. Instead, in our case, we want to
provide a reliable approach—with high precision and recall—
to help investors stay out of the market when a pump and dump
scheme is in action or to analyze anomalies in historical data.
V. RELATED WORKS
The pump and dump phenomenon is older than the cryp-
tocurrency revolution. Therefore, a wide portion of the lit-
erature is about pump and dumps done in the traditional
stock market. Allen et al. in [15] identify three categories
of market manipulation schemes: information-based, action-
based, and trade-based. The pump and dump schemes are
usually a combination of information-based and trade-based
manipulation. In 2004, Mei et al. [16] show that it is possible
to carry out pump and dump schemes just exploiting the
behavioral biases of the investors. They test their theory on
the pump and dump cases prosecuted by the SEC from 1980
to 2002, which confirm their hypothesis.
Several case studies highlighted that emerging markets were
prone to pump and dump schemes. Khwaja et al. in [17]
show that the Pakistani weak regulation of the national stock
exchange allowed brokers of the Karachi Stock Exchange to
arrange successful pump and dump schemes. Jiang et al. [18]
investigate on the stock pools scheme of the ’20s using daily
trading volume from the New York Stock Exchange between
1927 and 1929. The stock pools are groups of traders that
delegate to a single manager to trade stocks on their behalf.
Since a pool can move a large amount of money, they can
increase the volume of trades and attract outsiders to the
market. When the stock pool exits the market, the price quickly
drops. As reported by the University of Innsbruck in [19],
the Internet boom in the early years of 2000 led to the birth
of a new email-based pump and dump scheme. In this new
kind of fraud, the manipulators secure their position on the
market and then send millions of e-mails claiming to have
private information about substantial increases in the prices of
determined stocks. This causes an increase in the price and
volume of the target stocks, followed by a drop as soon as
the spam campaign ends. A later analysis in 2013 by Siering
in [20] shows that despite the authorities have taken several
countermeasures against fraudulent stock recommendations,
email-based pump and dump campaigns are still successful.
Some works about frauds in the cryptocurrency market
have been published in the past few years. The work of
Gandal et al. [21] show evidence that the first price spike
to 1000 USD of the Bitcoin may have been driven by market
manipulation. Using the well-known dataset of the Mt.Gox
exchange, they found suspicious trading activities carried out
by two actors, named ’Willy bot’ and ’Markus bot’. The
purpose of these actors was to buy Bitcoin to increase the price
and the daily volume artificially. Krafft et al. [22] investigate
on the behavioral patterns of the users on the Cryptsy exchange
market. In their work, they show that even tiny volumes of
buy trades can influence the market. They use bots to buy a
small amount of random currencies and conclude that traders
tend to buy currencies with recent activities. Li et al. [23]
conduct an empirical investigation on trading data obtained
from the pump and dumps from Binance, Bittrex, and Yobit,
focusing on the economic point of view. They show that pump
and dumps lead to short term increase in prices, volume,
and volatility followed by a reversal of the trend after some
minutes. Moreover, they show that the gain of the investors
depends critically on the time they obtain the signal, and for
this reason, outside investors are systematically disadvantaged.
The work of Kamps et al. [5] shows a first attempt to detect
pump and dumps using an adaptive threshold. They highlight
the issue that a reliable dataset of the confirmed pump and
dumps scheme does not exist, so they can not fully validate
their results. A crucial contribution of our work is to release
such a dataset. Xu et al. [4] focuses on the difficult task of
predicting pump and dumps, using one-hour intervals data
from Cryptopia and Yobit, also showing an approach to exploit
prediction to invest in alt-coins. Since both works have some
goals in common with ours, we conducted a thorough analysis
of their results on subsection IV-F.
VI. DISCUSSION
Is it possible for pump and dump groups to avoid the
detection? We based our features on the idea of detecting an
anomalous change of some market parameters and at the same
time to be robust against the natural oscillations of the volatile
cryptocurrencies market. So, if the admins of groups or some
vip members start to buy the currency gradually in a way that
the rise of this parameter is smooth, and the users are few, our
classifier could be not able to detect the pump and dump. In
this case, our classifier cannot detect 4 of the pump and dumps
in our dataset. These events were all carried out by one group,
and all of them record a consistent pre-pump phase in the hours
before the pump starts. Fortunately, this technique cannot be
applied frequently because a smart observer knowing the time
of the next pump and dump can exploit this pattern to unveil
in advance the targeted cryptocurrency. Moreover, after the
pump and dump, this operation will be noticed by most users
that could lose the trust of the admins and leave the group.
Can pump and dump groups manipulate Bitcoin or ma-
jor cryptocurrencies? To answer this question, we make a
straightforward simulation. Let us take the buy volume on the
first 10 minutes of the biggest pump and dump we monitored
that is of 31 BTC on the SingularDTV (SNGLS). Now, we
take a snapshot of the exchange order book for the trading
pair BTC/USD (data of April 12, 2019), and assume that the
market is frozen and only the members of the pump and dump
group can make actions, this is the best case for them to make
the price raise and get the attention of the outside investors.
We find that the amount of money at their disposal can rise
the value of BTC of less than 5 USD. Now, we analyze the
price oscillation of the Bitcoin in the hour before the snapshot
on time ranges of 10 minutes, and we find that the minimum
oscillation was of 10 USD while the maximum was more than
50 USD. If we made another similar simulation on the Ripple
(XRP), we get that the XRP value increases less than 0.0005
USD, while the minimum and maximum oscillation is of 0.001
and 0.002. As we can see, only the volume of the orders in the
orders book is enough to smooth the firepower of the pump
and dump group, and the higher price peak they can achieve,
in this extremely optimistic situation, is not enough to drum
up the interests of outside investors.
Is it possible for the exchange markets to stop pump and
dump schemes? In this work we show that it is possible to
detect a pump and dump scheme as soon as it starts. We also
believe that an exchange can detect better than us when a
fraudulent scheme like this one is in action. In fact, the data
owned by the exchange is more fine-grained than what we
could obtain: It has full knowledge on the kind of operations
performed, their amount, and exactly who performed them
during the pump and dumps. Moreover, we notice that small
policy enforcements against the pump and dumps can reduce
drastically the amount of these market manipulations. As an
example, BitTrex exchange announced [24] that it actively
discourages any type of market manipulation and will begin
to punish the participants. Since then, the amount of pump
and dumps in the exchange drastically decreased. We counted,
before the statement, more than 50 pump and dumps in the
5 months from July to the end of November 2017, and only
31 in almost one year after the statement. Another possible
counter-measure could be to stop transactions on a security
when it gains or loses more than some threshold, or give
special protection to cryptocurrencies with extremely low
market capitalization and trading volumes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we performed an in-depth analysis of the
pump and dump ecosystem. We have studied the relationship
that exists between the groups, the exchange, and the target
cryptocurrencies. We also presented two case studies and a
tool that can detect in real time a pump and dump in action.
Moreover, we have identified a peculiar kind of orders that
are particularly effective for the detection. We think that this
work helps to understand a complex phenomenon, improve
the awareness of the investors interested in the cryptocurrency
market, and can help the authorities regulate this particular
market in the future .
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